We consider the problem of risk-sensitive control of a stochastic network. In controlling such a network, an escape time criterion can be useful if one wishes to regulate the occurrence of large buffers and buffer overflow. In this paper a risk-sensitive escape time criterion is formulated, which in comparison to the ordinary escape time criteria penalizes exits which occur on short time intervals more heavily. The properties of the risk-sensitive problem are studied in the large buffer limit, and related to the value of a deterministic differential game with constrained dynamics. We prove that the game has value, and that the value is the (viscosity) solution of a PDE. For a simple network, the value is computed, demonstrating the applicability of the approach.
Introduction
In this paper we consider a problem of risk-sensitive control (or rare event control) for queueing networks. The network includes servers that can offer service to two or more classes of customers, and a choice must be made regarding which classes to offer service at each time. We study a stochastic control problem in which this choice is regarded as the control, and where the cost is a risk-sensitive version of the time to escape a bounded set. Hence, fixing c > 0, and denoting by σ the time when the queue-lengths process first exits a given domain, we consider E x e −cσ as a criterion to be minimized. Such a criterion penalizes short exit times more heavily than ordinary escape time criteria (such as E x σ, a criterion to be maximized). There are at least two motivations for the use of such criteria when designing policies for the control of a network. The first is that in many communication networks system performance is measured in terms of rare event probabilities (e.g., probabilities of data loss or excessive delay). The second motivation follows from the connection between risk-sensitive controls and robust controls. Indeed, as discussed in [14] , the optimization of a single fixed stochastic network with respect to a risk-sensitive cost criteria automatically produces controls with specific and predictable robust properties. In particular, these controls give good performance for a family of perturbed network models (where the perturbation is around the design model and the size of the perturbation is measured by relative entropy), and with respect to a corresponding ordinary (i.e., not risk-sensitive) cost.
In many problems, one considers the limit of the risk-sensitive problem as a scaling parameter of the system converges, in the hope that the limit model is more tractable. We follow the same approach here, and show that the normalized costs in the risk-sensitive problems converge to the value function of a differential game with constraints. As is well known, the convergence analysis is closely related to the large deviation properties of the sequence of controlled processes. An interesting feature in the setting of stochastic networks is that the asymptotic analysis of a sequence of controlled networks is in many ways simpler than the analogous asymptotic analysis of a sequence of uncontrolled networks. For example, if one were to fix a particular state feedback service policy at each station, then the calculation of the large deviation asymptotics is very difficult. In contrast, it turns out that calculation of the large deviation asymptotics of the optimally controlled network is quite feasible. This is largely due to the fact that a fixed service policy invariably includes some state discontinuities. For example, a priority policy switches drastically when the highest priority queue empties. When the policy is left as a parameter that is to be optimized these sharp discontinuities are not dealt with directly, since the control and the large deviation behavior are identified simultaneously. The situation is analogous to one found in the control of unconstrained processes such as diffusions. If a fixed nonsmooth feedback control is considered then large deviation asymptotics are generally intractable, but when the combined large deviation and optimal control problem is considered, much is possible [15] .
For simplicity, we restrict in this paper to a class of Markovian networks, and consider just one simple cost structure. Much more general statistical models can be treated with similar arguments, as can a more general cost. A more fundamental restriction is on the routing in the network. We assume a re-entrant line structure, so that the input streams follow a fixed route through the network-we do not allow either randomized or controlled routing. Relaxing the last conditions leads to a problem that is significantly more difficult to analyze, and would require a considerable extension of the results we prove. The deterministic game that is associated with the limit stochastic control problem involves two players. One player allocates service in a way analogous to the control in the stochastic control problem, and the other player perturbs the service and arrival rates. The cost is expressed in terms of the large deviation rate function for the underlying arrival and service processes, cumulated up to the time the dynamics exit the domain. Heuristically, the first player identifies those classes it is most worthwhile to allocate service to, so as to delay the escape as much as possible and thereby maximize the cost. The player who selects the perturbed rates attempts to minimize the cost by driving it out of the domain, while paying a cost for perturbing the rates.
Our main result states that as the scaling parameter of the system converges, the value for the stochastic control problem converges to the value of the game. By way of proving the result, we also show that the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated with the game has a unique (Lipschitz continuous) viscosity solution.
Several works have considered problems of optimal exit probabilities in the context of controlled diffusion processes, in the asymptotically small white noise intensity regime. Fleming and Souganidis [19] use viscosity solutions techniques to study a controlled diffusion where the control enters in the drift coefficient. Dupuis and Kushner [11] extend their results to the case where the diffusion coefficient is possibly degenerate. Their technique relates the stochastic control problem to the game in a more direct way, using time discretization, without involving PDE analysis. The stochastic control problem studied in the current paper has the property that the jump rates in certain directions (those that correspond to services, not to arrivals) can be controlled to assume arbitrarily low values, including zero. It appears to be a more subtle problem than the ones in the above cited papers, in that it is analogous to a controlled diffusion problem where the control enters also in the diffusion coefficient, and where no uniform non-degeneracy condition is assumed. This kind of degeneracy makes it difficult to apply the time discretization idea of [11] . The main idea of [11] , in which one directly relates the control problem to the game, is still fruitful in the current setting. Following this approach, we relate the limit inferior [resp., superior] of the asymptotic value for the control problem to the upper [resp., lower] value of the game. However, showing that the game has value and thereby obtaining the full convergence result for the control problem requires a PDE analysis.
The PDE analysis uses viscosity solutions methods. There are three types of boundary conditions associated with the PDE: Neumann, Dirichlet, and "state space constraint." The first two types of boundary conditions correspond in the game to the nonnegativity constraint on queue lengths and to stopping upon exit from the domain, respectively. The third type of boundary condition arises when there are portions of the boundary where exit can be blocked unilaterally by one of the players, and it is optimal for it to do so. It is well known since Soner [25] that such a scenario leads to the last boundary condition mentioned above. Combining techniques of [1] and [25] , we prove uniqueness of viscosity solutions for the PDE and show that the game's upper and lower values are viscosity solutions, thus establishing existence of value. The trivial but crucial fact used in the uniqueness proof is that the Isaacs condition holds (equation (38)).
As an example, we analyze a case where the domain is a hyper-rectangle, and where the network consists of one server and many queues, each customer requiring service only once. We find an explicit solution to the corresponding PDE, assuming the parameter c is large enough. This is only an initial result in this direction, but it shows that explicit solutions can be found. The solution turns out to be of particularly simple form (see equation (49)). The optimal service discipline stemming from the solution corresponds to giving priority to class i whenever the state of the system is within a subset G i of the domain. The partitioning of the domain into subsets has a simple structure too (see Figure 2 in Section 5 for an example in two dimensions). See [2] for explicit solutions in the case of tandem queues, as well as identities relating the perturbed rates with the unperturbed ones in a more general network.
There is relatively little work on risk-sensitive and robust control of networks. Ball et. al. have considered a robust formulation for network problems arising in vehicular traffic [4, 5] , and have explicitly identified the value function in certain instances. Although their model is similar to ours in that the network dynamics are modeled via a Skorokhod Problem, many other features, most notably the cost structure, are qualitatively different. In addition, the model they consider is not naturally related to a risk-sensitive control problem for a jump Markov model of a network.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the network and the stochastic control problem, describes a key tool in our analysis, namely the Skorokhod Problem (SP), introduces the differential game, and states the main result. Section 3 establishes the relation between the control problem asymptotics and the game's upper and lower values. Characterization of the upper and lower values of the game as viscosity solutions of a PDE, as well as uniqueness for this PDE are established in Section 4. Section 5 presents an example, and the paper concludes with Section 6, which gives the proofs of several lemmas. Throughout the paper, numbering such as Lemma a.b refers to the bth item of Lemma a.
Problem setting and the main result
The queueing network control problem. We consider a system with J customer classes, and without loss assume that each class is identified with a queue at one of K servers. Each server provides service to at least one class. Thus if C(k) denotes the set of classes that are served by k, then the control determines who receives service effort at server k from among i ∈ C(k). In particular, the sets C(k), k = 1, . . . , K are disjoint, with ∪ k C(k) = {1, . . . , J}. The state of the network is the vector of queue lengths, denoted by X. After a customer of class i is served, it turns into a customer of class r(i), where i = 0 is used to denote the "outside." We let e j denote the unit vector in direction j and set e 0 = 0 so that following service to class j the state changes by e r(j) −e j . The control will be described by the vector u = (u 1 , ..., u J ), where u i = 1 if class i customers are given service and u i = 0 otherwise. Since service can be given at any moment to only one class at each station, the control vector must satisfy i∈C(k) u i ≤ 1 for each k. We next consider the scaled process X n under the scaling which accelerates time by a factor of n and shrinks space by the same factor. We are interested in a risk-sensitive cost functional that is associated with exit from a bounded set. Let G be a bounded subset of IR J + that contains the origin (additional assumptions on G are given in Condition 1). Define
Then the control problem is to minimize the cost E x e −ncσ n , where E x denotes expectation starting from x, and c > 0 is a constant. With this cost structure "risk-sensitivity" means that atypically short exit times are weighted heavily by the cost. A "good" control will avoid such an event with high probability. The significance from the point of view of stabilization of the system is clear. (See also [15] for the robust interpretation).
A precise description of the stochastic control problem is as follows. Let G n .
whereṽ j = e r(j) − e j . It is assumed that for each i, λ i ≥ 0, while µ i > 0. For each n ∈ IN consider the scaling defined byL n,u f (x)
where f : n −1 Z Z J → IR and g(·) = f (n −1 ·). A controlled Markov process starting from x will consist of a complete filtered probability space (Ω, F, (F t ), P n,u x ), a state process X n taking values in G n that is continuous from the right and with limits from the left, a control process u taking values in U , such that X n is adapted to F t , u is measurable and adapted to F t , P u,n x (X n (0) = x) = 1, and for every function f :
x denotes expectation with respect to P n,u
x . For a parameter c > 0, the value function for the stochastic control problem is defined by
In this definition the infimum is over all controlled Markov processes.
A measurable function u(x, t), u : G n × [0, ∞) → U is said to be a feedback control. We will make use of two well known facts: to each feedback control there corresponds a controlled Markov process with u(t) = u(X n (t), t), and in the definition of the value function the infimum can be restricted to feedback controls.
In the formulation just given we allow the maximizing player to choose a control from the convex set U . This is a relaxed formulation, which allows the server to simultaneously split the effort between 2 or more customer classes. An alternative control space that is more natural in implementation consists of only the vertices of U , in which case the server can only server one class at a time. In a general game setting, the distinction between such "relaxed" and "pure" control spaces can be significant. However, in the present setting it will turn out that the value is the same for both cases. This is essentially due to the fact that the game arises from a risk-sensitive control problem, which imposes additional structure on the game, and will be further commented on below.
Dynamics via the Skorokhod Problem. Our main goal will be to study the asymptotics of V n , and in particular, to show that they are governed by the value of a deterministic differential game. In order to define the dynamics of this game we first need a formulation of the Skorokhod Problem (SP). We give here the simplest formulation which covers our needs. The reader is referred to [17] for a more general framework. Let
where D([0, ∞) : IR J ) is the space of left continuous functions with right hand limits, endowed with the uniform on compacts topology. When restricting to continuous functions we replace "D" with "C". Let a set of vectors {γ i , i = 1, . . . , J} be given and set I(x)
The Skorokhod Map (SM) assigns to every path ψ ∈ D + ([0, ∞) : IR J ) a path φ that starts at φ(0) = ψ(0), but is constrained to IR J + as follows. If φ is in the interior of IR J + then the evolution of φ mimics that of ψ, in that the increments of the two functions are the same until φ hits ∂IR J + . When φ is on the boundary a constraining "force" is applied to keep φ in the domain, and this force can only be applied in one of the directions d(φ(t)), and only for t such that φ(t) is on the boundary. The precise definition is as follows. For η ∈ D([0, ∞) : IR J ) and t ∈ [0, ∞) we let |η|(t) denote the total variation of η on [0, t] with respect to the Euclidean norm on IR J . Under a certain condition on {γ i } (known in the literature as the completely-S condition [22] ), it is known that solutions to the SP exist in all of D + ([0, ∞) : IR J + ). Under further conditions (namely, existence of the set B -see [20, 12, 17] and also Lemma 9 below), it is known that the Skorokhod Map is Lipschitz continuous, and consequently the solution is unique. Denoting the map ψ → φ in Definition 1 by Γ, the Lipschitz property states that there is a constant K 1 such that
The SP that will be considered here is the one for which γ i = e i − e r(i) = −ṽ i . For this problem, the following is well known. We next define a constrained ordinary differential equation. As is proved (in greater generality) in [12] , one can define a projection π : IR J → IR J + that is consistent with the constraint directions {γ i , i = 1, ..., J}, in that π(x) = x if x ∈ IR J + , and if x ∈ IR J + then π(x) − x = αr, where α ≥ 0 and r ∈ d(π(x)). With this projection given, we can now define for each point x ∈ ∂IR J + and each v ∈ IR J the projected velocity
For details on why this limit is always well defined and further properties of the projected velocity we refer to [ 
An absolutely continuous function φ : [0, ∞) → IR J + is a solution to (5) if the equation is satisfied a.e. in t. By using the regularity properties (4) of the associated Skorokhod Map and because of the particularly simple nature of the right hand side, one can show that φ solves (5) if and only if φ is the image of ψ(t) . = t 0 v(s)ds + x under the Skorokhod Map, and thus all the standard qualitative properties (existence and uniqueness of solutions, stability with respect to perturbations, etc.) hold [12, 16] .
As mentioned above, the SP formulation will be our means of defining the dynamics of a deterministic game. Before discussing this game, let us show how the same formulation is also useful for the stochastic control problem defined earlier in this section. First, sinceṽ j = e r(j) − e j = −γ j , it is easy to verify that for the particular SP considered here π(x, v) = v1 x+v∈Z Z J + for all x ∈ Z Z J + and v ∈ {ṽ j : j = 1, . . . , J}. Therefore the generatorL u of (1) can also be written as
A measurable function u(t), u : [0, ∞) → U is said to be an open loop control. Note that this control has no state feedback. When u is an open loop control, it is possible to write the corresponding controlled process X as Γ(Y ). The process Y , which will be called the unconstrained controlled process, is a controlled Markov process with a simpler structure. To be precise, let
and letL n,u 0 be defined analogously to (2) . A controlled Markov process X n on G n [respectively, Y n on n −1 Z Z J ] is defined as before, but now using the generator (L n,u f )(t) = (L n,u(t) f )(x) [resp.,
The simplification that the SP introduces is that if u is an open loop control, and if Y n is a controlled Markov process corresponding to L n,u 0 on (Ω, F, (F t ), P n,u x ), then X n = Γ(Y n ) is a controlled Markov process corresponding to L n,u on the same filtered probability space. The role played by the SP in relating constrained and unconstrained processes is exhibited here in a simple fashion, for introductory purposes. We will, in fact, use it in a slightly more complicated setting later on in Lemma 7 and Lemma 8.
A differential game. In this paper, we prove that the value function V n (x) for a stochastic control problem associated with our queueing network model is approximately equal (for large n) to the value function of a related differential game. In addition, the dynamics of this game are defined in terms of an associated SP. Before introducing the game formally we explain why this is to be expected. In a problem with no control, the exponential decay rate of quantities such as Ee −cnσn is given in terms of the sample path large deviation rate function associated with the process, which in turn can be expressed in terms of the rate function for the Poisson primitives that drive the model. This is supported by the well known Laplace's principle [10] . Heuristically, one thinks of the rate function as a cost paid for changing the measure so as to make the rare event of exiting on short time interval a probable event. Laplace's principle asserts that the decay rate can be expressed as the solution to a deterministic optimization problem involving the cost −cσ combined with the cost of changing the measure: cf. [24, Eq. (5.20 
. When the stochastic model involves optimal control, there is one more variable to optimize over in the limit, and this results in a game. The game's deterministic dynamics are the natural law of large numbers limit under the changed measure. Boundary constraints and constraining meachanisms which are present in the prelimit model are represented in the limit model by the SP. The cost for the game involves the large deviation rate function for the Poisson primitives, the time till the dynamics exits the domain, and the parameter c.
We thus consider a zero sum game involving two players. One (which we call the maximizing player) selects the service allocation and attempts to maximize. The other (called the minimizing player) chooses the perturbed arrival and service rates and attempts to minimize. Throughout, the perturbed rates will be denoted by an overbar, as inλ i ,μ i .
Recall that for u ∈ U , u i stands for the fraction of service effort given to class i. The control space for the maximizing player is
, the control space for the minimizing player will bē
where v j = e j , and as beforeṽ i = e r(i) − e i . Then the dynamics are given by
To define the cost for the game, let ρ :
By convention, if λ i = 0 andλ i > 0 for some i, we let ρ = ∞ (recall that by assumption, µ i > 0). Let the exit time be defined by
With c > 0 as in (3), the cost is given by
As in [18] we need the notion of strategies. We endow bothŪ andM with the metricρ(ω 1 , ω 2 ) = n 2 −n ( n 0 |ω 1 (t) − ω 2 (t)|dt ∧ 1), and with the corresponding Borel σ-fields. A mapping α :M →Ū is called a strategy for the maximizing player if it is measurable and if for every m,m ∈M and
In an analogous way, one defines a mapping β :Ū →M to be a strategy for the minimizing player.
The set of all strategies for the maximizing [resp., minimizing] player will be denoted by A [resp., B]. The lower value for the game is defined as
and the upper value as
To avoid confusion, we remark that despite the terms "upper" and "lower" value, it is not in general
Main result. We make the following assumption on the domain G. Let
Condition 1 We assume that the domain G satisfies one of the following.
1. G is a rectangle given by
for some z i > 0, i = 1, . . . , J.
2. G is simply connected and bounded, and given by
where for i ∈ J + , we are given positive Lipschitz functions φ i : IR J−1 → IR, and
This condition covers many typical constraints one would consider on buffer size, including separate constraints on individual queues (Condition 1.1) and one constraint on the sum of the queues (Condition 1.2).
The shape of the domain is simpler in Condition 1.1, in that it is restricted to a hyper-rectangle. On the other hand, it is also possible under this condition for the maximizing player to unilaterally prevent an exit through a certain portion of ∂G \ ∂IR J + . Although it is in principle possible that the dynamics could exit through this portion of the boundary, it will always be optimal for the maximizing player to not allow it. Consider the simple network illustrated in Figure 1 . The maximizing player can prevent exit through the dashed portion of the boundary simply by stopping service at the first queue. As a consequence, there are in general three different types of boundarythe constraining boundary due to non-negativity constraints on queue length, the part of the boundary where exit can be blocked, and the remainder. These three types of boundary behavior will result, in the PDE analysis, in three types of boundary conditions. We now define the three portions of the boundary. Under Condition 1.1, let
For notational convenience, we let ∂ c G = ∅ under Condition 1.2. In both cases we then set
As usual, we will denote G o = G \ ∂G andḠ = G ∪ ∂G. ∂ c G is the part of the boundary were the maximizing player can prevent the dynamics from exiting, and ∂ o G is the part where it can not. Finally, it will be convenient to denote
Our main result is the following.
Remark: A stronger form of the convergence statement in fact holds. Namely, This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2 and the fact that for each n, V n is Lipschitz on G n , with a constant that does not depend on n (Lemma 2).
The proof is established in two major steps.
Step 1 will be an immediate consequence of the main results of Section 3, and Step 2 will follow from Section 4.
Step 1. We define a version of the game, technically easier to work with, in which all perturbed rates (λ i ,μ i ) are bounded by b < ∞. The corresponding upper and lower values, defined analogously, are denoted by V b,+ and V b,− . Then we show that for all b large enough (cf. Theorem 3)
Step 2. We show that for b large, V b,+ = V b,− on G. To this end, we formulate a PDE for which we show that uniqueness of (Lipschitz) viscosity solutions holds (Theorem 5), and also show that both V b,+ and V b,− are viscosity solutions (Theorem 6). Since V n (x) does not depend on b, neither do V b,± (x). Theorem 2 follows.
The control problem and the game
We begin by stating some basic properties of the stochastic control problem and of the deterministic game. The proofs of these properties are deferred to Section 6.
Consider the following generators, defined for any u ∈ U and m ∈ M , for constrained and unconstrained controlled Markov processes:
The definition of the corresponding controlled processes will be made precise in Lemmas 7 and 8.
Owing to the logarithmic transform in (3), one expects V n to satisfy an Isaacs equation [19] . In fact, V n satisfies
We comment that this is also the dynamic programming equation (DPE) for an associated stochastic game that is related to the deterministic game via a law of large numbers scaling and limit, and will not be further considered in this paper.
Lemma 1
The value function V n of (3) uniquely solves the DPE (7) .
The following lemma gives a key estimate on the value function.
We comment that the above result is, in general, not valid for V n on n −1 Z Z J + , since V n changes abruptly near the portion ∂ c G of the boundary.
For each fixed u ∈ U , the mapping m → ρ(u, m), when restricted toμ i such that u i > 0, is strictly convex with compact level sets. We conclude that the infimum over m in the DPE is achieved, and denote such a point by m n (x, u). Although part 1 of the following lemma is not used elsewhere, it indicates why the Isaacs condition should hold in (7) . We introduce two parametric variations of the game defined in Section 2. The first will be associated with domain perturbation (parameterized by the symbol a), and the second with a bound on the perturbed rates (parameterized by the symbol b).
For some fixed a 0 > 0, consider perturbations G a , a ∈ (−a 0 , a 0 ) of the domain G defined as follows. If G satisfies Condition 1.1, then G a is defined as G, but with z i replaced by z i + a,
Analogously to the definition (6) ofM , let
Strategies and values for the game are then defined analogously to the way strategies and values are defined for the original game, usingM b in place ofM . It will be convenient to set M ∞ . = M andM ∞ .
=M , and to refer to the original game of Section 2 as the case b = ∞.
The cost, sets of strategies, lower and upper values of the games resulting by the introduction of the parameters a and b will be denoted as
Lemma 4 Assume Condition 1. Then
The following lemma shows that any nearly optimal strategy for the minimizing player will satisfy a uniform upper bound on the integrated running cost. Moreover, there is a finite time T 0 such that for each such minimizing strategy, any open loop control used by the maximizing player leads to exit by T 0 . Similarly, given any strategy for the maximizing player the minimizing player can restrict to open loop controls that force exit by T 0 .
In the rest of the section the strategies β will be assumed (without loss) to be in B z 0 ,T 0 , where z 0 , T 0 are as in Lemma 5, and are fixed throughout. Also, m ∈M will be assumed to be inM (α, T 0 ) whenever it is clear which α is considered. With an abuse of notation, we denote B z 0 ,T 0 by B.
We are now ready to prove the following result.
Theorem 3 Let Condition 1 hold, and let b ∈ [b * , ∞). Then for any x ∈ G and any {x n } converging to x (with x n ∈ G n ),
Proof of Theorem 3: The result is established by considering a sequence of stochastic processes, defined using the constrained ODEs, but for which the controls u and m are governed by, on one hand, a nearly optimal strategy for the game, and on the other hand, a nearly optimal control for the stochastic control problem. The technique uses standard martingale estimates, and is based on the construction (deferred to Section 6) of an auxiliary controlled Markov process that is controlled by the selected strategy and stochastic control.
Upper bound
According to Lemma 4.2, it is enough to show that for all a > 0 lim sup
Let β ∈ B b and a > 0 be given, and set C a (x, β) = sup u∈Ū C a (x, u, β[u]). It is enough to show that lim sup
We therefore fix β throughout, and turn to prove (11) . We can assume without loss that
Note that in the DPE (7) the supremum is with respect to u in a compact set U , and that the function being maximized is continuous in u (for each y). Let u n (y) denote a point where it is achieved. Then for any m ∈ M and y ∈ G n ,
Lemma 7 Let n be fixed, and let b ∈ [b * , ∞), β and x n be as above. Then there is a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (F t ),P ), andF t -adapted RCLL processesX n ,Ȳ n and m n such that with P -probability one m n (t) = β[ū n ](t) a.e. t,ū n (t) = u n (X n (t)),X n = Γ(Ȳ n ),X n (0) =Ȳ n (0) = x n , and for any f
are (F t )-martingales. Moreover, with T 0 as in Lemma 5 let N n denote the total number of jumps
Proof: See Section 6.
Returning to the proof of (11), letū n (t) . = u n (X n (t)) and letσ n be the first exit time ofX n from G. Combining (13) and Lemma 7, for any bounded stopping time S ≤σ n ,
Apply (15) with S =σ n a ∧σ n ∧ T . If T is sufficiently large, then (12) and the fact that c > 0 implŷ σ n a ≤ T . Thus, usingĒ xn V n (X n (σ n ))) = 0,
Again using the uniform boundedness of V n (x) (Lemma 2), there is a constant b 2 < ∞ such that for all n V n (x n ) ≤ b 2Pxn (σ n a ≤σ n ) + C a (x, β).
In what follows, we show thatP xn (σ n a ≤σ n ) tends to zero. To this end, note that L n,u,m
where id is the identity map. Therefore, using again Lemma 7,
where η n is a zero mean martingale. To prove that
it is enough, by Doob's maximal inequality, to show that E|η n (T )| 2 → 0.
Let [x](t) = s∈[0,t] |∆x s | 2 . By the Burkholder-Davies-Gundy inequality (see [9] , VII.92),
where c 1 is a constant. Since each jump is bounded by c 2 n −1 (c 2 a constant) and the total number of jumps N n (T ) satisfies (14),Ē
which proves (17) . This implies that sup [0,T ] |Ȳ n (t) − ψ n (t)| → 0 in distribution, and therefore the continuity of Γ implies sup [0,T ] |X n (t) − φ n (t)| → 0 in distribution. By Lemma 4.1,
where b 1 > 0 depends only on a. Hence by (17),P xn [σ n a ≤σ n ] → 0 as n → ∞. Therefore (16) 
This gives (11) and completes the proof of (10).
Lower bound
Next we prove lim inf
By Lemma 4.2, it is enough to show that for all a < 0
Let α ∈ A be given, and set C a (x, α) = inf m∈M b C a (x, α[m], m). Then it suffices to show
Fixing α, we now prove (19) .
Interchanging the order of infimum and supremum in equation (7) (see [23] , Corollary 37.3.2), and noting that the infimum over m is of a continuous function with compact level sets, we denote by m n (y) a point where the infimum is achieved. By Lemma 3, the componentsλ n i (y) andμ n i (y) of m n (y) are all bounded by b 0 . For u ∈ U and y ∈ G n , 0 ≥ L n,u,m n (y) V n (y) + c + ρ(u, m n (y)).
Lemma 8 Let n be fixed, and let α and x n be as above. Then there is a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (F t ),P ), andF t -adapted RCLL processesX n ,Ȳ n and u n such that withP -probability one u n (t) = α[m n ](t) a.e. t,m n (t) = m n (X n (t)),X n = Γ(Ȳ n ),X n (0) =Ȳ n (0) = x n , and for any f ,
Letm n (t) = m n (X n (t)) and letσ n be the first exit time ofX n from G. By (20) and Lemma 8, for any bounded stopping time S ≤σ n ,
Denotingm n (t) = ((λ n i (t),μ n i (t)), define φ n as φ n = Γ(ψ n ), where
Then the definition of C a (x, α) implies
Apply (21) with S =σ n a ∧σ n ∧ T , with large enough T , using the fact that V n ≥ 0 to get The proof thatP xn (σ n a ≤σ n ) tends to one is analogous to the proof of the thatP xn (σ n a ≤σ n ) → 0 in the upper bound. It is therefore omitted. Hence
This gives (19) , and the proof of (18) is established.
In fact, the value of the game is independent of b for large b, so that the game has a value with the unbounded action space M . As the result depends on Theorems 3, 5, 6 we postpone the proof to Section 6.
The PDE
In this section we show that the upper and lower values of the game are the unique Lipschitz viscosity solutions of the PDE (23) 
It will be useful to note that the infimum is over the compact set M b , and the map (q, u, m)
Here, γ i are the directions of constraint that were introduced in Section 2.
Definition 2 Let a Lipschitz continuous function u : X → IR be given (where X ⊂ G). We say that u is a subsolution [respectively, supersolution] to (23) 
[ H(Dθ(y)) ∧ min i∈I(y)
and
We say that V is a viscosity solution to (23) , if it is both a subsolution on G and a supersolution on G \ ∂ c G.
Remark: In case that ∂ c G = ∅, a viscosity solution is often called a constrained viscosity solution (cf. Soner [25] , Capuzzo-Dolcetta and Lions [8] ). The requirement that V is a subsolution up to the boundary ∂ c G-the part of the boundary where exit can be unilaterally blocked-serves as a boundary condition on this part of the boundary. Note that in the current paper, the term 'constrained' refers to the part ∂ + G of the boundary, where it is the mechanism associated with the Skorokhod Problem that constrains the dynamics to G.
First, we address uniqueness of solutions to (23) .
Theorem 5 Let u be a subsolution and v a supersolution to (23) . Then u ≤ v on G.
The proof combines ideas from two sources, namely [1] (which is based on [13] , and discusses how to deal with the constrained dynamics on ∂ + G), and [25] (to accommodate the fact that under Condition 1.1 part of the boundary (∂ c G) can be thought of as imposing a state-space constraint on the maximizing player).
The following lemma will be used in proving Theorem 5. In the interest of consistency with previous publications, we use B in Lemma 9 below to denote a certain subset of IR J (although everywhere except in this section, B denotes a set of strategies). Part 1 states that the "Set B" Condition holds, namely a condition under which it was proved in [12] that the SM enjoys the regularity property (4) . The proof that this condition holds in the current setting can be found in [17] . The existence of a smooth version of the set B is proved in [1] (before Lemma 2.1). For Parts 2 and 3, see Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 of [1] (note that the condition that γ i are independent holds).
Lemma 9
1. There exists a compact, convex, and symmetric set B ⊂ IR J with 0 ∈ B o , such that if z ∈ ∂B and if n is an outward normal to B at z, then for all i ∈ {1, . . . , J} z, e i ≥ −1 implies γ i , n ≥ 0 and z, e i ≤ 1 implies γ i , n ≤ 0.
In addition, the unit outward normal n(x) to B at x ∈ ∂B is unique and continuous (as a function on ∂B). In what follows, we keep the notation of Lemma 9 for B,n, Ξ, ξ, ̺ and µ.
Letn be the extension of
Proof of Theorem 5: For a > 0, let
Let δ > 0. Then it suffices to show that for all small a > 0, δ > 0, one has U ≤ (1 + δ)V on G.
Arguing by contradiction, we assume that this is not true. Then there are a and δ arbitrarily small such that
Below we let c i , i = 1, 2, ... denote positive constants. Consider Condition 1.1 first. Let
Let (x,ȳ) ∈Ḡ 2 achieve the maximum of Φ inḠ ×Ḡ. By continuity of U and V , there existsz ∈Ḡ so that ρ = U (z) − (1 + δ)V (z). Note that
Hence by the Lipschitz continuity of V ,
By Lipschitz continuity of U and the lower bound on ξ given in Lemma 9,
By (30) and (31),
Sincex andȳ are bounded, (32) implies |x −ȳ| 2 ≤ c 5 ǫ and so |x −ȳ| ≤ c 6 ǫ 1/2 .
Using this in (32) we have |x −ȳ − ǫ 1/2ȳ | ≤ c 7 ǫ 3/4 . Let
and note that the map x → u(x) − θ(x) has a maximum atx ∈ G. Since u is a subsolution, (24) must be satisfied atx. Denoting
we have from Lemma 9.2 that Dθ(x) = 1 ǫ q ǫ + aDµ(x).
Suppose i is such thatx i = 0. Then x −ȳ − ǫ 1/2ȳ , e i ≤ 0 and so by Lemma 9.1,
Since by Lemma 9.3, γ i , Dµ(x) < 0, it follows that γ i , Dθ(x) < 0. It follows from (24) that
namely,
On the other hand, let
Note that
and that the map y → v(y) − α(y) has a minimum atȳ. Sincex ∈Ḡ, (34) implies thatȳ ∈ G \ ∂ c G for all small ǫ. Since v is a supersolution, (25) is satisfied at y. An argument as above shows that H(Dα(ȳ)) ≤ 0, and therefore
It follows from the definition of H, using ρ(u, m) ≥ 0, that
and therefore
Now Dµ is bounded, and by (34), boundedness of n and ̺, and the Lipschitz continuity of Ξ, it follows that ǫ −1/2 q ǫ converges to zero as ǫ → 0. Note that by (22) and the following comment, H is uniformly continuous on IR J . Therefore, (36) and (37) give a contradiction when a > 0 and ǫ > 0 are small and δ > 0 fixed.
Under Condition 1.2 the above argument is not valid, since (29) may not hold. However, in this case the minimizing player can force exit from any point on ∂G\∂ + G, and the additional complications due to the "state-space constraint" used under part 1 are no longer needed. In other words, instead of (28) we can consider
and a review of the above proof shows that (36) and (37) still hold if the expression ǫ 1/2 is replaced by zero everywhere in (35) and (37). A contradiction is then obtained analogously.
We next consider the upper and lower values of the game, and remind the reader that in this section the rates m are assumed bounded. Theorem 6 V − and V + are solutions to (23) .
Recall that from Lemma 6, V ± are Lipschitz.
Proof of Theorem 6:
We use the specific form of v(u, m) and ρ(u, m). These can be written as
We have i∈C(k) u i ≤ 1. The b i are linear, and the c i are convex. Hence, as a direct consequence of [23, Corollary 37.3.2], the Isaacs condition holds, namely
Another fact that we will use is that for any y ∈ G \ ∂ c G there is δ 0 = δ 0 (y) > 0 which serves as a lower bound on the exit time. Namely, if φ solvesφ = π(φ, v(u, m)), φ(0) = y, then
The bound is an immediate consequence of the u and m being uniformly bounded.
By definition, V ± (x) = 0 for x ∈ ∂ o G. Thus we only need to establish (24)- (25) . The proof consists of four parts.
Proof that V − is a supersolution on G\∂ c G.
Standard dynamic programming arguments show that for δ > 0,
where φ is the solution toφ = π(φ, v(u, β[u])), with φ(0) = x. Let θ be smooth, and let y ∈ G \ ∂ c G be a local minimum of V − − θ. We can assume without loss that V − (y) = θ(y). We need to show
We shall assume the contrary and reach a contradiction. Thus, there exists a > 0 such that H(Dθ(y)) ≥ a, and Dθ(y), γ i ≥ a, i ∈ I(y). For any strategy β, ifū(t) ≡ u 0 ,
for all t. Let φ denote the dynamics corresponding toū and a generic β, starting from y. Note that the mapping z → I(z) is upper semi-continuous, in the sense that for any z there is a neighborhood of z on which I(·) ⊂ I(z). Using the boundedness of m this implies that for any β ∈ B, one has I(φ(r)) ⊂ I(y) for r ∈ [0, δ], if δ > 0 is chosen small enough. We now use that φ is a solution to the SP. Choosing such a δ > 0, for any r ∈ [0, δ] there exist a i ≥ 0 (that may depend on r) such thaṫ
Using the continuity of Dθ and taking δ > 0 smaller if necessary, (42) and (43) imply, for t ∈ [0, δ],
Taking δ even smaller if necessary (so that it is at most δ 0 ), we have from (39) that Letting u =ū, the last two displays give (using θ(y) = V − (y)) θ(φ(δ)) ≥ V − (φ(δ)) + aδ/8, so that V − (φ(δ)) − θ(φ(δ)) < 0 for all δ > 0 small, contradicting the assumption that y is a local minimum of V − − θ. This proves that V − is a supersolution on G\∂ c G.
Proof that V − is a subsolution on G.
Let θ be smooth and y ∈ G a local maximum of V − − θ. In case that y ∈ ∂ c G, letŪ y,β,δ be the set of controls u ∈Ū for which the trajectory φ determined by u and β[u] and starting from y does not exit G on [0, δ]. Given y ∈ ∂ c G, it is clear thatŪ y,β,δ is not empty for all δ small and all β, by considering the control u = 0. Moreover, for all δ small enough, (40) is valid where the supremum extends only over u ∈Ū y,β,δ . Indeed, given u ∈Ū y,β,δ , consider u ′ that agrees with u on 
where a i ≥ 0 may depend on r. By possibly taking δ smaller, and smaller than δ 0 , we have, using the continuity of Dθ and (45), (46) that Specializing to β =β, the last two displays show that V − (φ(δ)) − θ(φ(δ)) > 0 for all δ > 0 small. This contradicts the assumption that y is a local maximum of V − − θ, and as a result, V − is a subsolution.
Proof that V + is a supersolution on G\∂ c G.
The proof is analogous to the proof that V − is a subsolution. Most details are therefore skipped. The dynamic programming principle states that for δ > 0,
where φ is the dynamics corresponding to α and m, starting from x. can be obtained by an argument analogous to that used to prove (44), using (47) in place of (40).
Proof that V + is a subsolution on G.
We need to show that H(Dθ(y)) ∨ max i∈I(y)
where θ is smooth, and y ∈ G is a local maximum of V + − θ. In the special case where y ∈ ∂ c G, we can assume without loss that the supremum in (47) extends only over α ∈ A y,δ , the set of strategies under which, for any m ∈M b , the dynamics associated with α and m, and starting from y, does not leave G before δ. The proof of (48) is analogous to the proof of (41), and is skipped.
This completes the proof that V − and V + are solutions to (23) .
A competing queues example
Consider a queueing network with only one server, providing service to J classes. Each customer requires service once. In this example all arrival rates are positive: λ i > 0 for all i, hence J + = {1, . . . , J}. This network, "the k competing queues," has been studied extensively, in discrete and continuous time (see [3, 26] and references therein). When the criterion (to be minimized) is either the average cost or the discounted cost, and the one-step cost is a positive linear combination i c i x i of the queue sizes x i , the optimal policy is the µ-c rule, which is a priority discipline, giving absolute priority to the non-empty queue for which µ i c i is maximal. Under the cost studied here, the optimal policy is quite different.
Proposition 1 Consider the case where G is a hyper-rectangle, given as G = {x : 0 ≤ x < z i }, where z i > 0 are constants. Assume that λ i > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , J. If c is large enough, then the viscosity solution to the PDE (23) is given as
where α i > 0 are constants depending on c.
We remark that the constants α i are uniquely defined by (51) below. In the totally symmetric case, where µ i = µ, λ i = λ, z i = z for all i, the solution takes the form V (x) = α min i (z − x i ). In this case, the optimal service discipline can be interpreted as "serve the longest queue." An asymmetric two dimensional example is given in Figure 2 , where the domain G is divided into two subdomains G 1 and G 2 in accordance with the structure (49), and the optimal service discipline corresponds to giving priority to class i when the state is within G i , i = 1, 2. Thus the optimal control under our escape-time criterion is very different from the optimal controls for the average or discounted cost criteria.
Proof: The constraint directions are given by γ i = e i . The Hamiltonian is given by where
Using strict convexity and smoothness of the map m → H(p, u, m), the minimum over m is attained
For the proposed solution, DV (x) ∈ −IR J + wherever the gradient is defined. For p ∈ −IR J + , maximizing H(p, u) over u clearly gives
We use the well known fact that the definition of viscosity solutions can be equivalently stated in terms of sub-and superdifferentials (see [6] , Lemma II.1.7). Note that (26) and (27) hold, since V = 0 on ∂ o G. Hence it suffices to verify that (24) [resp., (25) ] holds where Dθ(y) is replaced by any superdifferential [subdifferential] of V at y.
We show first that the equation H(DV (x)) = 0 holds wherever DV is defined. The proposed form (49) satisfies DV (x) = −α i e i , wherever the gradient is defined, with i = i x depending on x. By the special form of the gradient, the equation H(DV (x)) = 0 takes the form
The function F i is strictly convex, F i (0) = 1, and F i (α i ) → ∞ as α i → ∞. Since c i > 0, it follows that there are unique positive constants α i where F i (α i ) = 1 + c i , i = 1, . . . , J. These are the constants in (49). In particular, (51) holds for i = i x , and H(DV (x)) = 0.
Next consider any interior point x at which the gradient is not defined. Clearly there are no subdifferentials at that point, and any superdifferential is given as a convex combination of −α i e i , i = 1, . . . , J. Let B(e i , ǫ) be the open ball of radius ǫ about e i . DenoteS = {ν ∈ IR J : ν i ≥ 0, ν i = 1}, S = {ν ∈ IR J : ν i ≥ 0, ν i ≤ 1}, S ǫ = S ∩ ∪ i B(e i , ǫ), and S c ǫ = S − S ǫ . Let q = − i ν i α i e i . It suffices to show that H(q) ≥ 0 for ν ∈S, but since we later need a stronger statement than that, we show that in fact H(q) ≥ 0 holds for ν ∈ S. By (50),
By (51), c + λ i (1 − e α i ) + µ i ≥ 0 and c + λ i (1 − e α i ) ≤ 0, and it follows that there are constants A 1 , A 2 , A 3 and A 4 such that for all c and i = 1, . . . , J,
We first consider small perturbations ν of e 1 . To show that H(q) ≥ 0, it suffices to show that H 1 (q) ≥ 0. Note that (51) implies H 1 (q)| ν=e 1 = 0. Also,
Hence, for γ = e i − e 1 (where i = 1), using c + λ 1 (1 − e α 1 ) ≤ 0, (51) and (52),
for all c large. Analogous calculations give ∇ ν H 1 (q)| ν=e 1 · γ ≥ 1 for γ = −e 1 as well. As a result, the directional derivatives (∂/∂γ)H 1 (q)| ν=e 1 in the directionγ, whereγ are of the form γ = (y − e 1 )/ y − e 1 , y ∈ S, are bounded below by 1/2. Hence H 1 (q) ≥ 0 for ν ∈ S within a neighborhood of e 1 and c large. Consequently, a similar statement holds for H(q). Since the same argument holds for neighborhoods of e i , i = 2, . . . , J, we conclude that there is ǫ > 0 and c 0 such that H(q) ≥ 0 for ν ∈ S ǫ and c ≥ c 0 .
Next consider ν ∈ S c ǫ . We first provide a lower bound on (∂/∂c)H (q). Differentiating (51) with respect to c,α i . Using (52) , for all c large, 0 ≤α i ≤ (λ i e α i − 1) −1 . Using this, the fact that ν is bounded away from ∪ i {e i }, and by taking c large, one has
Note that the above bound holds for all c ≥ c 1 and all ν ∈ S c ǫ , where c 1 is a constant. It follows that there is c 2 such that for all c ≥ c 2 and all ν ∈ S c ǫ , one hasH(q) ≥ i µ i . Since H ≥H − i µ i , H(q) ≥ 0. We conclude that H(q) ≥ 0 for all ν ∈ S. In particular, H(q) ≥ 0 where q is any superdifferential of V at any interior point.
Finally, consider a point x ∈ G ∩ ∂IR J + . Any superdifferential of V at x is given as q = i∈I(x) η i e i − J j=1 ν j α j e j , where η i ≥ 0. If max i∈I(x) q, γ i ≥ 0, then (24) holds. Otherwise, q, γ i < 0 for all i ∈ I(x). Consequently, any q of the form above is given as − J j=1 ν ′ j α j e j , with ν ′ ∈ S. As we have shown, in this case, H(q) ≥ 0. Therefore (24) holds.
Similarly, any subdifferential of V at x ∈ G ∩ ∂IR J + is of the form − i∈I(x) η i e i − J j=1 ν j α j e j . In particular, q, e i ≤ 0 for all i, and (25) holds.
Proofs of lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1: Let W n (x) .
= inf E u,n x e −ncσn . Since c > 0, W n is well defined. Standard iterative methods can be used to construct a solution to the DPE 0 = inf u∈U L n,uW n (x) − ncW n (x) , x ∈ G n (53) and the boundary conditionW n (x) = 1 if x / ∈ G n . We claim that this solution coincides with the risk-sensitive cost. To see this, consider a controlled Markov process (X n , u) that starts at x. Then
n,u(s)W n (X n (s))ds is a martingale. Equation (53) implies L n,u(s)W n (X n (s)) ≥ ncW n (X n (s)), and sō
for some nonnegative process Z. Using Gronwall's lemma we obtain that for each t < ∞ E n,u xW n (X n (t ∧ σ n ))e −nc(t∧σ n ) ≥W n (x), and by the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem E n,u x e −ncσ n ≥W n (x).
If we define u in terms of the feedback control that minimizes in (53) then all the inequalities above become equalities, thus showing thatW n = W n .
The definition of W n implies W n (x) = exp [−nV n (x)] . If we insert this into the DPE ofW n and multiply by exp [nV n (x)] then the equation
Recall the definition l(x) = x log x − x + 1 for x > 0. We now divide throughout by n and use the convex duality relation
to represent the terms in the previous display. For example, in the sum on j we take x =λ j /λ j and y = − nV n x + 1 n v j − nV n (x) . Representing each term in this way and multiplying by −1 produces the first line in (7) . The boundary condition that is the second line in (7) follows directly from the relation between W n and V n .
Proof of Lemma 2:
We reduce the Lipschitz property on (n −1 Z Z J + ) ∩Ḡ to a Lipschitz property near the boundary. To this end we use the following coupling. For z ∈ G n , let u n (z) be a minimizer in (53). Given a point x on the lattice, let X x denote the process corresponding to the generator L n,u n and starting at x (see the discussion following (2)). To simplify the notation we will not explicitly denote the dependence of quantities such as X x on n. Let u(t) = u n (X x (t)), and let F t be the filtration generated by X x .
Fix a point y = x and let X y denote the queueing process on this probability space that starts at y and uses the control u. In other words, X y is the image, under the Skorokhod map, of y + X x (·) − x. The evolution of the processes X x and X y are identical, save that jumps which would cause X y to leave Z Z J + are deleted. Automatically, u is suboptimal for the control problem starting from y. Define V n (y; u) = −n −1 log E u,n x e −ncσ y
where σ y is the exit time of X y from G. Note that due to the coupling we may take expectations with respect to E u,n x rather then with respect to E u,n y . Since (X y , u) is a (possibly suboptimal) controlled Markov process, we have
Define σ = min{σ x , σ y }. By Theorem 1 on the Lipschitz continuity of the Skorokhod map we have
since at least one of the processes has left G by σ. In the last display, K 1 is the constant appearing in (4) . We claim that
To establish this, note that
However, by the strong Markov property,
and together with (55) we have (57).
To prove the lemma, one needs to show that |V n (x) − V n (y)| ≤ c 0 |x − y| for all n and all x, y ∈ (n −1 Z Z J + ) ∩Ḡ, where c 0 does not depend on x, y and n. It suffices to prove this inequality for x, y such that |x − y| = n −1 . Since the roles of x and y are symmetric, and in view of (57), it suffices to show that for {x ∈ G : dist(x, ∂ co G) ≤ K 1 n −1 },
where c 1 > 0 is a constant.
Let us first treat the case where G is not a rectangle. In that case, Condition 1 implies that for any x with dist(x, ∂ co G) ≤ K 1 n −1 ,
where c ′ is a constant. Let such i be fixed. To show (58), it is enough to show that for any x such that dist(x, ∂ co G) ≤ K 1 n −1 , and any n and u,
Recall that λ i > 0. Let S t denote the event that all service processes and all arrival processes, except for the one corresponding to i, do not increase on [0, t]. Recall that the expected time till a Poisson process of rate λ hits level K is K/λ. Then for any α ∈ (0, 1)
Choosing t 0 = −(log α)/nc = 2c/nλ i and using P u,n
where c 3 > 0 is the probability that a Poisson process with rate nc 4 has not jumped by time t 0 = 2c/λ i n. This proves (60), which implies (58), and hence the statement of the lemma holds.
In the case where G is a rectangle, the bound (57) does not suffice since V n (x) is discontinuous near ∂ c G. We therefore prove that a similar bound applies, where there supremum is over
To apply the previous argument we need to show that if X x (t) is close to ∂ c G, then neither X x nor X y will exit (locally) through that boundary. This is clear for X x : the only way for the process to leave G is due to a service to one of the queues, say, queue j, leading to an increase in queue i. However, allowing this service is certainly not optimal: it is better to avoid this control, as our objective is to increase σ x . To prevent X y from exiting we need to modify the coupling argument as follows. The control u y used by X y avoids a jump that leads X y to exit through ∂ c G (that is, queue j above will not be served if X y i (t) = z i − 1.) Note that this is the only possible type of jump that leads the process out of G. Moreover, the ℓ 1 distance between X x and X y may only decrease due to this change in control: the control is changed only if X x i (t) < X y i (t), and following the service X x i increases by 1 so that |X x i (t) − X y i (t)| decreases by 1, while X x j decreases by 1.
Condition 1 still implies (59), but only for x such that
For such x, the argument in the last paragraph holds. However, for x near ∂ c G there is nothing to prove, since the process never exits through such a boundary.
Proof of Lemma 3: The first part is an immediate consequence of the fact that u i ≥ 0 and both L n,u,m V n (x) and ρ(u, m) depend on u as i u i η i , where η i is a function of m i , x, n but not of u.
For the second part of the lemma, one can explicitly solve for m n in terms of V n , and get m n (x, u) = m n (x) = ((λ n i (x)), (μ n i (x))), wherē
The result follows from Lemma 2, since it shows that there is a constant b 2 independent of x, n where
Proof of Lemma 4:
We fix b ∈ [b * , ∞] and suppress it from the notation throughout the proof. Item 1 of the lemma is trivial under Condition 1.1. Under Condition 1.2, by continuity of the functions φ i , we only need to show is that ∂ co G a and ∂ co G do not intersect. Consider first a > 0, and let x ∈ ∂ co G a . Then x i = a + φ i (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x J ) for some i ∈ J + , and therefore x cannot belong to the closure of G. The proof for a < 0 is similar.
where m 0 sets allλ i = λ i andμ i = 0. Then ρ(u(t), β 0 [u](t)) is bounded by a constant, and the dynamics, unaffected by u, follow X(t) = x + i λ i e i t and leave the bounded set G within a finite time bounded by diam(G)/ max i λ i < ∞. Therefore
It is useful to notice that for all a ∈ (0, a 0 ) and y ∈ ∂ o G there is i = i y ∈ J + such that y + 2ae iy ∈ G a . Similarly, for all a ∈ (−a 0 , 0) and y ∈ ∂ o G a there is i = i y ∈ J + such that y + 2ae iy ∈ G.
First consider a > 0 and recall that σ a (resp., σ) is the exit time from G a (resp., G), so that for any fixed u and β[u] we have σ ≤ σ a . Therefore, since c and ρ are positive, Thus to prove the Lipschitz property a one-sided bound suffices. Recall that φ(σ) is the exit point from G and for each β define the extension β a by
wherem sets allμ j = 0 andλ j = 1 j=i φ(σ) . Then for any β For V + a (x) note that an argument as above gives V + a (x) ≥ V + (x). For each m define m a by
wherem is as above. Let α ǫ be an ǫ-optimal strategy. Then, since for any fixed u and m we have σ ≤ σ a , Proof of Lemma 5: We suppress b from the notation, throughout the proof. It is obvious that one can restrict the infimum over β ∈ B to the class of strategies β for which C(x, β) ≤ V − (x) + 1. Within this class, for every β and u,
and therefore one always has that σ ≤ T 0 . = (V (x) + 1)/c. Lemma 5 asserts an upper bound on the cost till time a fixed time T 0 , and so we must define the strategy for times t ∈ [σ, T 0 ]. Letm be an arbitrary fixed element of M . Then the extended β is just
With this definition one has that C(x, u, β[u]) = C(x, u,β[u]). One can therefore further restrict to strategies β satisfyingβ = β. For such β, it follows that
where c 1 does not depend on u, β. The result regarding V − follows.
Regarding V + , let m 0 be a control which sets all µ i and λ i to zero, except that λ i 0 = 1 for some i 0 ∈ J + . Then for any α ∈ A and m for which Proof of Lemma 6: Fix b ∈ [b * , ∞] which we omit from the notation. Recall from Lemma 4 that V ± are bounded on G. We first show that V − is Lipschitz. Assume first that Condition 1.2 holds.
Let β x ǫ be an ǫ-optimal strategy starting from x, i.e., Here, m 0 sets allμ i and allλ i to zero, except that it setsλ i * = λ i * , where i * is as above. Consequently, σ y < σ x + c ′ |x − y| for some c ′ > 0, and there exists u ǫ such that
Since x, y ∈ G and ǫ > 0 are arbitrary, and c 3 does not depend on them or on b, V − is Lipschitz,
In case that Condition 1.1 holds, the same argument shows that and an m ǫ = m ǫ (x, y) for which Arguing again by the Lipschitz property of the Skorokhod map and the definition of m 0 , there is a constant c 4 for which (σ x − σ y ) + ≤ c 4 |x − y|. Hence
Since c 5 does not depend on x, y, ǫ or b, we have that V + is Lipschitz uniformly Proof of Lemma 7: The processes are constructed recursively using a sequence of standard exponential clocks. Recall that L n,u,m is given for every n, u ∈ U , m ∈ M by
Given n, x n and β, we construct a filtered probability space and three processes,X(t),ū(t) and m(t) (to simplify notation, we do not write the superscript n in the notation ofX n ,ū n andm n ) such that (a)X,ū andm are (F t )-adapted; is an (F t )-martingale. For (a-d) to hold, it suffices that (a-c) hold, and (e) on any finite interval the processX jumps finitely many times-we denote the kth jump by τ k and let τ 0 = 0; (f) the random times (τ k ) are stopping times on (F t ), and (g) denoting X k =X(τ k ), for any k,
The construction is recursive. On a complete probability space (Ω,F ,P ) we are given 2J independent i.i.d. standard Poisson processes, denoted a i and b i , i = 1, . . . , J. Let T a i (k) [resp., T b i (k)] denote the first time a i [resp., b i ] equals k. For each ω ∈ Ω we construct recursively a sequence of times (τ k ) and the processesX,ū andm up to time τ k . Once these processes are defined, we will define (F t ),F t ⊂F , t ≥ 0, and verify that items (a-c), (e-g) are satisfied on (Ω,F , (F t ),P ).
We setX(0) = x n andū(0) = u n (x n ). Sincem need only be defined almost everywhere on [0, ∞), we do not define it at zero nor at any τ k , k = 1, 2, . . .. Now assume that we have constructed τ i , i ≤ k as well as the processesX andū on [0, τ k ] andm a.e. on [0, τ k ]. Letû k (t) = u n (X(t ∧ τ k )), t ≥ 0. Let alsom k = β[û k ]. Withû k (·) = (û k i (·)) andm k (·) = ((λ k i (·)), (μ k i (·))), let where inf ∅ = +∞. We first consider the case that τ k+1 < +∞. In this case, there is i such that either ∆a i (p k i (τ k+1 )) > 0 or ∆b i (q k i (τ k+1 )) > 0.
In the former case we letv k = v i ; otherwise we letv k =ṽ i .
The three processes are defined on the next interval as follows. LetX(t) =X(τ k ) for t ∈ (τ k , τ k+1 ), andX(τ k+1 ) =X(τ k ) + n −1 π(X(τ k ),v k ). Letū(t) = u n (X(t)) for t ∈ (τ k , τ k+1 ]. Leť u(t) = u n (X(t ∧ τ k+1 )) and definem(t) = β[ǔ](t), t ∈ [0, τ k+1 ]. Note that since β is a strategy, this definition ofm is consistent with its definition up to τ k since so is the definition ofū. For the same reason, for a.e. t ≤ τ k+1 ,m(t) =m k (t). In particular, the equations for p k i , q k i still hold if we replace hats by bars, namely, 
Note that the above relations are consistent in the sense that for a given k, they hold not only for t ∈ [τ k , τ k+1 ], but in fact for t ∈ [0, τ k+1 ]. Hence, on the event τ k → ∞, one can equivalently consider the processes p i (t) = n t 0λ i (s)ds, q i (t) = n t 0μ i (s)ū i (s)ds, i = 1, . . . , J, t ≥ 0.
This completes the definition of the three processes on [0, τ k+1 ].
In case that τ k+1 = +∞, the definitions above ofX,ū andm all apply on (τ k , τ k+1 ) and there is nothing else to define.
To complete the construction of the three processes onΩ× [0, +∞), we must consider the set Ω 0 of ω ∈Ω for whichT . = sup τ k is finite. We show that this set isP -null owing to the fact that the rangeM b of β consists of bounded functions. SupposeT is finite. The construction above defines X,ū andm on [0,T ). Letū ′ (t) =ū(t) for t <T and defineū ′ (t) arbitrarily on [T , +∞) but such thatū ′ ∈Ū . Thenm ′ = β[ū ′ ] agrees withm a.e. on [0,T ]. Since each component ofm ′ is bounded by b,
However, by construction,T < ∞ implies that either a i (p i (t)) → ∞ or b i (q i (t)) → ∞ as t ↑T , for some i. HenceT < ∞ must be a null set. We letX,ū andm be defined arbitrarily on Ω 0 .
The definition of the processȲ is similar to that ofX, but where π(x, v) is replaced by v throughout. The relationX = Γ(Ȳ ) is clear from the construction.
Define for each t ≥ 0F t to be the σ-field generated by {Ȳ (s), s ∈ [0, t]}. Note that it is equivalently defined as the σ-field generated by {a i (p i (t)), b i (q i (t)), i = 1, . . . , J}, where p i , q i are as in (64). By construction,ū(t) = u n (X(t)), t ≥ 0 and item (c) holds. Item (b), namely that m = β[ū], also holds by construction.X andū are therefore (F t )-adapted, and since β is a strategy, so ism, and item (a) holds. Items (e) and (f) are trivial. Concerning (g), let i k ∈ {1, . . . , 2J} denote the index i satisfying (62) in case that ∆a i (p k i (t)) > 0 holds, and let it denote i + J in the case ∆b k i (q k i (t)) > 0. It suffices to show that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , 2J},
where Z k is a normalization factor (not depending on i). For k = 0 (τ k = 0), this is a well known property of exponential clocks. For k > 0, the same argument holds, merely because conditional on F τ k , the processes · τ k p i (s)ds, · τ k q i (s)ds are independent, and moreover, a i (· − τ k ) − a i (τ k ), b i (· − τ k ) − b i (τ k ) are still independent Poisson processes (which is a statement on the lack of memory for exponential random variables).
The proof of the claim regarding the martingale associated with L 0 is similar (only simpler). This completes the proof of the first part of the lemma. wherem sets allμ j = 0 andλ j = 1 j=i φ(σ) , and the minimum is componentwise. It is clear thatβ is a strategy. Letū be any extension of u to [0, ∞), and denote byφ andσ the dynamics and exit time corresponding to x,β,ū. Recall that by (9) b is greater than all λ i and µ i . Thus 1991 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary 60F10, 60K25; Secondary 93E20, 60F17.
